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MILITARY INSTITUTIONS:

DUE

PROCESS FOR CADETS-

Andrews v. Knowlton, 367 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd 509
F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1975).
Much litigation in the past has dealt with the rights of college
students.' It was the landmark decision of Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education2 which first held that procedural due process
was to be applied to the disciplinary actions of colleges and universities. Following that decision the courts generally have adopted a
standard of fairness and reasonableness when considering whether
or not a student's rights to due process were violated.' The cumulative effect of the litigation which followed Dixon manifests itself in
the 1969 decision of Esteban v. Central Missouri State College.' In
that decision the court held that the following criteria should be met
in order to comply with the requirements of due process:
1. the accused must be given adequate notice, in writing, of the
specific allegation lodged against him/her and the nature of the
supporting evidence;
2. the accused shall be given an opportunity to be heard;
3. there must be substantial evidence to support the action.
Although the courts are not compelled to adhere strictly to the
criteria set forth in Esteban, it is evident that they are quite concerned with affording college students protection under the safeguard of due process.5
Contrawise, there has been very little litigation dealing with
students of the United States military institutions, save the well
publicized cases concerning such things as cheating on examinations. Although it may be argued that not many cadets have sought
judicial remedies, the lack of judicial determination concerning the
rights of cadets may indicate a reluctance on the part of the court
system to afford these students protection under the constitutional
safeguards which were designed to be applied to all persons equally.'
1. See Due v. Florida A & M Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Zander v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968); State ex rel. Sherman v.
Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942); Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 279 F.
Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th
Cir. 1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. County Ct. 77 (1887). See also
Smart, The Fourteenth Amendment and University Disciplinary Procedure,34 Mo. L. REV.
253 (1969).
2. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
3. Due v. Florida A & M Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
4. 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).

5.

K.

ALEXZANDER

& E.

SOLOMON, COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW,

430-38 (1972).

6. This proposition is a basic assumption in the following analysis of the case of cadet
Albert Andrews. It is duly noted at this point that one of the reasons for the lack of judicial
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Whether or not the courts are unwilling to enter into a direct confrontation with the military because of its link to the executive
branch of government, or whether the courts refuse to invoke their
power because of the high ethical standard supposedly attributable
to the military schools, it remains that all persons should be entitled
to the minimal safeguards of due process. A graphic illustration of
the court's reluctance to uphold such a proposition is the case of
7
Andrews v. Knowlton.

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 3, 1973 cadet Albert Andrews was apprehended by
the military police for driving an unauthorized vehicle onto the
West Point campus.' Subsequently, Andrews was ordered to provide
an investigating officer with a written explanation of his presence
on campus in such a vehicle. Andrews stated that he had driven
another cadet to the campus and was on the premises for 15 or 20
minutes. The report by the military police indicated that the car
had been observed on campus for a period in excess of two hours.
Therefore, Andrews was subjected to the Academy's disciplinary
procedure for violations of the Cadet Honor Code.'
The adjudication of the alleged violation by Andrews took part
in two stages: a proceeding before the Honor Committee followed by
an Officer Board hearing. In a closed hearing the Honor Committee
found Andrews guilty of a violation of the Honor Code for lying on
his explanation report.' 0 Subsequently, in a questionably de novo
proceeding, the Board of Officers found Andrews guilty of lying, the
determinations concerning the rights of cadets is that many cadets have not pursued a
judicial remedy.
7. 367 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 509 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1975). Although the
Andrews case was combined on appeal with White v. Knowlton, 361 F. Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), af'd 509 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1975), this combination was initiated to avoid duplication
of arguments. This note will concentrate on the Andrews case only.
8. The military police also found cadet Andrews to be out of uniform and transporting
alcohol. The original charge was that of "gross misconduct" which would have resulted in
Andrews' receiving only demerits.
9. Upon matriculation all cadets sign an oath of allegiance which requires that they
abide by military regulations and orders from their superiors. One such order was a memo
from the Commandant, in 1972, which required the Honor Committee to make initial determinations in all cases of alleged Honor Code violations. Therefore, cadet Andrews was
brought before the Honor Committee. The signing of the oath is not a waiver of constitutional
safeguards per se. However, when considered in light of the fact that the federal courts feel
that the government can limit the application of constitutional safeguards because of an
overriding interest in preserving the high ethical standard carried by military personnel,
signing the oath does operate as a waiver.
10. The Honor Code provides that "No cadet shall lie, cheat, steal or tolerate those who
do."
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sole penalty for which is separation from the Academy.
Andrews then brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York to contest his separation from
the Academy; but was dismissed before full pretrial discovery took
place. This decision was affirmed by the court of appeals."
II.

DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS

In the instant case, Andrews was brought before an Honor Committee made up of elected cadets on a charge of lying.' 2 The actual
Honor Committee is comprised of 44 cadets, but only 12 cadets are
selected to hear a given case.' 3 The applicable standard is "guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt" and a unanimous vote is required to
convict.'4 After a hearing this Committee found Andrews guilty of
violating the Honor Code.
The court of appeals found that this stage of the factual adjudication of Andrews' case was totally lacking in procedural safeguards.'" To quote the court:
While it is clear that the proceedings before the Cadet Honor Committee were wholly lacking in procedural safeguards, we are unpersuaded by the record now before us that the hearing was a critical
stage in the separation of the appellant from the Academy for Honor
Code violations.'6
It is also clear from this quotation that the court does not consider
the Honor Committee hearing a "critical stage" in the Academy's
separation procedure. This part of the court's opinion seems illogical
and irreconcilable with the factual situation presented here.
Article 16 of the Regulations for the United States Military
Academy governs the separation of cadets." This provision makes
no mention of the Honor Committee being part of that procedure.
However, in 1972, the Commandant issued a memo entitled "USCC
Processing of Cadet Honor Cases" which specifically requires that
apparent violations discovered by officers be referred to the Honor
Committee first. Thus, without a unanimous vote of guilty by the
11. Review denied 44 U.S.L.W. 3183 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975).
12. Brief for Appellant at 4, White v. Knowlton, 361 F. Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
13. This is mandated by custom and written interpretation of the Honor Code.
14. Brief for Appellant at 21, White v. Knowlton, 361 F. Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
15. Cadet Andrews was not given notice of the specific allegations made against him.
Neither was he informed of the names of the witnesses who were to testify against him, nor
was he permitted to confront those witnesses. Although Andrews was permitted to testify on
his behalf, several defense witnesses were unable to appear because of receiving 48 hours
notice as to a change in the hearing date.
16. 509 F.2d at 907.
17. § 16.04 is the provision which governs separation of cadets.
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Honor Committee any proceeding initiated against a cadet for violating the Honor Code is ended. The Honor Committee is, in fact,
an indispensible step in the separation procedure of the U.S.M.A.
The court's use of the word "critical" is an exercise in semantics. Critical is the equivalent of indispensible in this case. No Officer Board hearing of separation would have resulted if the Honor
Committee had not found Andrews guilty of violating the Honor
Code. What could be more critical than the initial step in depriving
Andrews of his degree, his military rank, and his potential career
earnings?
If the Academy's disciplinary proceeding, i.e., the Honor Committee hearing, was to have any meaning or effect for Andrews, it
would seem that he should have been alerted to the specific allegations lodged against him, as well as being given an ample opportunity to be heard. 8 Although not all disciplinary proceedings require
the same degree of due process, the implications and consequences
of this Committee's proceedings require, at the very least, the application of certain minimal, constitutional safeguards. 9 Assuming
arguendo, that there is no distinction between Andrews' status as a
cadet and his status as a student, a composite of minimal due process in this situation should be:
an adequate notice of the hearing,20
a definite written statement of the charges prior to the hearing,2'
information as to the nature of the evidence against him, 2
an opportunity to be heard, 23
the right to consult with counsel in preparing a defense. 4
In determining precisely which safeguards are essential to insure a fair hearing, it is proper to consider the burden which would
be imposed upon the Committee by such measures. 5 Given the
magnitude of the private interests which exist in the instant case,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

18. Andrews was only informed of the nature of the charges against him at the Honor
Committee hearing. It is questionable whether he could prepare an adequate defense on such
short notice.
19. The federal courts drew a clear distinction between what constitutes due process
for college students as opposed to what constitutes due process for cadets. Cf. Esteban v.
Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969) and Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382
F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967). Esteban provides some guidelines for determining exactly what
constitutes due process for college students and these guidelines are more demanding than
those set out for cadets in Wasson.
20. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).
21. Graham v. Knutzen, 351 F. Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1972).
22. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
23. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).
24. Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972).
25. Id. at 207.
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the imposition of the aforementioned safeguards would create little,
if any, relative burden on the Committee.
Another flaw in the court's reasoning becomes evident upon a
close scrutiny of the following excerpt from the second stage of the
adjudication of Andrews' case:
There is no evidence in the record that the decision by the Cadet
Honor Committee in any way influenced the members of the Boards
of Officers. On the contrary, the record convinces us that the proceedings before the Boards of Officers were de novo and were as free from
taint as is a trial in which jurors are aware that the defendant before
them has been indicted by a grand jury. We find, therefore, that the
Cadet Honor Committee is a charging body whose decisions had no
effect other than to initiate de novo proceedings before a Board of
Officers. We further hold that the requirements of Wasson and
Hagopian were met because each appellant was separated from the
Academy only after he was afforded a hearing with full procedural
safeguards. Accordingly, we conclude that on the basis of the record
now before us, the Due Process Clause does not require the utilization
of any particular procedure by the Cadet Honor Committee."
In analyzing this finding, the first issue that must be considered is
whether or not the Board of Officers hearing was, in fact, a de novo
proceeding.27 In support of their contention that it was a de novo
proceeding the court argues that there are no facts in the record to
indicate the Honor Committee decision tainted the Board of Officers hearing. Board members are sworn to an oath of impartiality
and fairness.2" In addition, the burden of proof of an Honor Code
violation is upon the Academy while the burden to rebut is upon the
26. 509 F.2d at 908.
27. There appears to be an underlying assumption on the part of the courts that all
Board of Officers hearings are de novo proceedings.
28. Army Regulation 15-6:
Do you swear that you will faithfully perform all duties incumbent upon you as a
member of this Board; that you will faithfully and impartially examine and inquire
according to the evidence, your conscience, and the laws and regulations provided, into
the matter now before you without partiality, favor, affection, prejudice, or hope of
reward that you will find such facts as are supported by substantial evidence of record;
that, in determination of those facts which are in dispute or are difficult of proof, you
will use your professional knowledge and best judgment and common sense in weighing
the evidence, considering the probability or improbability thereof, and with this in
mind will regard as established facts those which are supported by evidence deemed
most worthy of belief; and that you will make such findings and recommendations as
are appropriate to, warranted by, and consistent with your findings, according to the
best of your understanding of the rules and regulations for the government of the Army,
Department of the Army policies, and the customs of the services, guided by your
concept of justice, both to the government and the -individuals concerned. So help you
God.
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accused. However, it seems that these procedures do not eliminate
all possibility of bias on the part of Board members. Prejudice may
well exist, if only because of a desire to maintain the authoritative
and disciplined structure of the armed services. This purpose might
be defeated by a decision which would undermine junior officers and
future leaders of the army, in this case members of the Cadet Honor
Committee.
Thus, a denial of due process at the committee level might
prejudice the board hearing without an independent violation at
that level. 9 In light of the above, it is unrealistic to declare that the
use of the proper procedure at one level would necessarily rectify any
improper procedure applied at a lower level. For example, if an
appeals court discovers an error committed at the trial level, the
case may be remanded or reversed. It certainly is not sufficient to
argue that because the appeals procedure was correct no prejudice
30
existed.
III.

RIGHT OF FREEDOM FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION

In the Andrews case the basis for his separation from the Academy was that he allegedly lied on a written report which had been
prepared in compliance with an order given by Captain Stillwell,
the officer in charge of the disciplinary investigation. According to
Stillwell, the "explanation report" filed by Andrews was not sufficiently detailed. Captain Stillwell instructed the cadet to be more
specific as to the time and place of the incident in his second report.
It was a discrepancy between this second report and one prepared
by the military police which gave rise to the allegation of the Honor
Code violation by Andrews. 31
The court of appeals rejected the argument that Andrews was
deprived of his Miranda warnings and that the statement used
against him was in violation of his constitutional right against selfincrimination.31 The court indicated that Andrews' situation was
analogous to that of a grand jury investigation:
29. Counsel for the appellant had wanted to depose the Board members on that precise
question, but was precluded from doing so when the complaint was dismissed.
30. The Board reviews the findings of the Honor Committee when determining whether
or not a cadet should be separated from the Academy.
31. Andrews' written report was used against him at both the Board and Honor Committee hearings. The following analysis of the court's opinion deals only with the use of the
statement by the Board.
32. If this had been a court martial situation, Andrews would have been informed of
his right to be free from self-incrimination. See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, 10 U.S.C.
§ 831 (1970).
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The government analogizes the situation at bar to that where a person suspected of a crime perjures himself before a grand jury in the
absence of Miranda warnings, and then seeks to prevent prosecution
for perjury (by invoking the exclusionary rule) on the basis of absence
of warnings. Such failure to warn does not require exclusion
of the
3
perjurous statement in subsequent perjury prosecution .
There is a rational basis for the limited use of the right against
self-incrimination in reference to a grand jury investigation. Widespread use of such an exclusionary rule would yield a "license to
lie". 3 4 The conclusion drawn by the court, therefore, was that no
constitutional infirmities existed in the non-suppression of the second report. The court used impeccable reasoning to draw their conclusion by extrapolation of the grand jury analogy. However, if this
was not a proper analogy to draw the court's conclusion was incorrect.
As argued by counsel for the appellant, the analogy should have
been drawn between Andrews' situation and that of a criminal investigation. Andrews did not make his statement to a constitutionally endowed, quasi-judicial body. His report was submitted to Captain Stillwell. Andrews was the sole focus of the investigation conducted by Stillwell in conjunction with the military police similar
to a suspected criminal. Furthermore, in conjunction with the last
point, Andrews was not given the opportunity to decline to testify.
Although Andrews' situation was not in fact a criminal prosecution, he should have been afforded the use of a constitutionally
35
guaranteed safeguard in order to protect himself and his interests.
According to a 1967 Supreme Court decision:
[t]he availability of the privilege does not turn upon the type of
proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of
the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites.36
Thus whether or not a criminal trial took place is irrelevant.
Assuming arguendo the court of appeals was correct in rejecting
the criminal prosecution analogy, the Board of Officers hearing was
convened pursuant to Army Regulation 15-6. According to paragraph 10 of that regulation, any relevant and material ". . . oral
or written matter .. " is proper evidence for introduction at the
33. 509 F.2d at 908.
34. United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965).
35. U.S. Const. amend. V provides:
No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
36.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).
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hearing. However, this does not mean that the regulation should be
strictly interpreted and applied without regard to the fifth amendment, for paragraph 13(a) provides that:
No witness shall be compelled to incriminate himself or to answer any
question the answer to which might tend to incriminate him.
The Academy seems to have an unfair advantage over a cadet
by being able to order him to submit a written statement concerning
events in controversy and then using that statement against him.
Alternatively, if cadet Andrews would have refused to prepare the
report requested, he would have been subjected to disciplinary actions for insubordination.
The court of appeals in this decision seems to have ignored the
basic ideas of equity, justice, and fair play. Because the Constitution applies to all persons regardless of their status, students at
military institutions should be entitled to the same rights.
IV.

LACK OF EFFECTIVE REMEDY

Neither the district court nor the court of appeals addressed
themselves to the issue of remedies, but it is important that this
issue be fully explored. Assuming arguendo that there was a violation of Andrews' due process rights, what type of relief would be
appropriate? The appellant prayed for both declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as for costs and disbursements for the action.
The declaratory relief sought by the appellant was very broad. 3 7
If any or all of the relief prayed for had been granted, it would have
affected not only Andrews' case but would have had a resounding
effect on the United States Military Adademy. The entire policy
making process of West Point would undergo a drastic change. Infractions such as those allegedly committed by cadet Andrews
37. In the complaint seven separate declarations were prayed for:
1. that Andrews was deprived of his constitutional rights of due process by the actions
of both the Honor Committee and the Board of Officers;
2. that the compulsory written statement obtained from the appellant prejudicially
deprived him of his rights to be free from self-incrimination;
3. that the application of the Academy's Honor Code is arbitrary and therefore is
unconstitutional;
4. that the punishment stipulated by the Honor Code was cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the appellant's rights under the 8th amendment;
5. that the Honor Code was void on its face because it was unconstitutionally vague
in violation of the due process of the fifth amendment;
6. that the proceedings of both the Committee and Board hearings were not in conformance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, i.e., without Federal jurisdiction,
therefore were null and void;
7. that the order of separation was null and void.
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might draw the penalty of demerits rather than expulsion from the
Academy. No longer would the single penalty of separation suffice
as the punishment for all Honor Code violations. In other words, a
new disciplinary system might have to be established on the theory
that the punishment is only just when it fits the violation. It appears
that this is the most equitable premise from which to prescribe
punishment, but this is not the only problem that might be created
by a declaratory judgment being granted in favor of Andrews.
The federal courts are not too eager to upset the delicate balance which exists between themselves and the executive branch of
government. If the declaratory relief prayed for by Andrews had
been granted, a good deal of tension between these two branches of
government might have resulted. The military seems to have retained its autonomy from the judiciary partly because it is considered to be part of the executive branch of government. Encroachment by the courts into the domain of the armed services, which in
theory are under the guidance of the President, 3 may have severe
and unwanted repercussions.
Assuming arguendo that the court did grant the declaratory
relief prayed for, it might have had to face an even greater problem.
If the military (as part of the executive branch of government)
would refuse to comply with the court's ruling, an impasse would
have been reached. The judicial branch of government would be
virtually powerless to enforce its decision. As a result of their incapacity, the courts, as well as the military, could lose a great deal of
prestige. Considering the possible implications of such a decision,
the courts might not readily grant such a prayer.
The injunctive relief sought was temporary, preliminary, permanent, and mandatory in nature. Even if separated from the
Academy, Andrews would be required to serve two years of active
duty. The temporary and preliminary injunctions would stave off
the call to active duty for Andrews.
The permanent and mandatory relief is directed to the reinstatement of the cadet. If this relief were granted, Andrews would
be reinstated into the Academy in good standing. But is reinstatement sufficient to satisfy the needs of the appellant?
As the district court held, any cadet found guilty of an Honor
Code violation by the Honor Committee suffers from limitations of
his freedom, damage to character, and harm to potential career. 9
A guilty verdict by the Honor Committee results in immediate con38. U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
39.

Andrews v. Knowlton, 367 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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finement in a special area known as the Borders Ward. There are
numerous personal restrictions which go along with this isolation.
Similarly, one's character is questioned by the mere fact of confinement in such quarters. Even if the court were to grant the relief
prayed for, upon returning to the Academy, Andrews could be subjected to various forms of harassment. Silencing is an unofficial but
traditional form of Academy discipline. It would prevent Andrews
from having normal social and personal relations with members of
the Academy or its alumni. As a result, it is possible that because
of this incident, Andrews would not achieve his potential advancement in rank.
Deputy Commandant, Colonel Burke W. Lee summed up the
situation aptly:
If the Committee determines that the Cadet has violated the Code
he can no longer be accepted as a member of the corps ....
11
The granting of injunctive relief would supply a general solution to
the problems presented in this case, but it appears that no complete
remedy exists which would repair all of the injury done cadet Albert
E. Andrews III.
Daniel N. Kosanovich
40.

Brief for Appellant at 12, White v. Knowlton, 361 F. Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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